

Sullo scetticismo e sulla sfida dworkiniana di Federico Arena

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On Scepticism and Federico Arena's Dworkinian Challenge

Abstract: In this comment I discuss some ideas on scepticism and its objections, described by Federico Arena. In order to clarify and enforce Arena's work, I offer some questions and suggestions in three aspects. First, I suggest a possible theoretical gap in the argument about the lack of an empirical ground for moral statements in his Scandinavian legal realism (Hägerstrom) description. Second, I find an interesting similarity between the Hägerstrom's argument about our trend to believing in the objectivity of duties and Hume's argument on association of ideas. Finally, I propose that Arena could make quite clear Hart's argument on internal and external standpoint because it is quite relevant in the positivism-realism debate, and also because show us how -according Hart- judges believe in law's objectivity.

Keywords: Scepticism, Legal positivism, Realism, Interpretivism.

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